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NOTES AND COMMENT
VALiDITY or CONDiTioNAi-SALE CONTRACTS AS AFFECTED BY Ex-
PRESS OR IMPLIMD PERMISSION TO PURCHASER TO SELL IN THE OR-
DINARY CouRsE op Busnmss. Conditional sales have always been
viewed with more or less disfavor by the courts, but now, m every
state, with the exception of Louisiana,' such a reservation of title
by vendor is valid as against the bona fide purchasers and creditors
of the conditional vendee, if there has been sufficient compliance
with the recording laws that may exist.2 The question to be herein
considered is whether that general rule is in any way modified
'Barber Asphalt Pay. Co. -v. St. Louts Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So.
193 (1908).
'Ann. Cas. 1916 A. 1273; Rem. Comp. Stat. 3790, providing that con-
ditional sales shall be absolute as to all bona fide purchasers and subse-
quent creditors, unless within ten days after the taking of possession by
the vendee, a memorandum of such sale is filed.
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where the goods are purchased for the purpose of resale. This is
a problem of practical significance to the business world in that it
involves the question whether one may safely purchase property
from a dealer in such property without first making an investiga-
tion as to his title.
The weight of authority and better reasoning supports the view
that this authority to the vendee to sell the property purchased by
the conditional sale does not m any way affect the character of the
contract, and, as between the original parties the contract is valid.3
The following will be a discussion, first, as to the validity of this
authority to resell with respect to purchasers from the conditional
vendee, and second, as to its validity with respect to creditors.
PURCHASERS
The authority to resell is of several kinds. It may be express
authority by the conditional seller of the property to the buyer ;4
it may be authority implied from facts and circumstances which
give rise to the inference that actual authority was in fact given ;5
or, it may be apparent authority which like implied authority also
arises from facts and circumstances,-this being the recogmzed
objective test,' but under the subjective test the authority is on
estoppel.7 An examination of the cases will reveal that this distinc-
tion between implied and apparent authority has not been generally
recognized. In many of the cases where an implied authority is
stated to exist, the decision giving the subvendee priority is ac-
tually based upon an estoppel, thus indicating that what the court
had in mind was not an implied authority, but an apparent
authority 8
It would seem to be perfectly obvious that one who buys from a
conditional vendee, having authority conferred upon him, either
express or implied to sell, obtains a good title, and this is the general
ruleY Many of the cases insist upon the subvendee being a bona
'Re Pierce, 97 C. A. A. 537, 157 Fed. 755 (1907) Thompson v. Arm-
strong, 11 N. D. 198, 91 N. W 39 (1902), failure to file a conditional sale
contract did not operate as between the vendor and purchaser to transfer
title to the latter.
' Gen. Secur Co. v. Reo Motor Car Co., 91 Cal. App. 16, 266 Pac. 576(1928) Trousdale v. Winona Wagon Co., 25 Ida. 130, 137 Pac. 372 (1913).
6 Spooner v. Cummings, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 839 (1890), allowed to
prove a course of dealing, Brett v. Forseen, 17 Manitoba L. R. 241 (1907).
6 O'Loughlin v. E. M. Jennings Go., 107 Conn. 365, 140 Atl. 758 (1928)
Citizens Say. & Invest. Co. v. Hunt's Garage, 128 Miss. 535, 91 So. 133(1922) Clarke Bros. v. McNatt, 132 Ga. 610, 64 S. E. 795, 26 L. R. A.(N. S.) 585 (1909).
TSaltus v. Everett, 20 Wendell 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541 (1838), (bill of
sale).
647 A. L. R. 87.
'Robinson's Appeal, 63 Conn. 290, 28 Atl. 40 (1893) Bass v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 169 Ala. 154, 53 So. 1014, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 374(1910), (dealer) South, Bend Iron Works v. Reedy, 5 Pennewill 361, 60
Atl. 698 (1905), (dealer) Peasley v. Noble, 17 Ida. 686, 107 Pac. 402, 27
L. R. A. (N. S.) 216, 134 Am. St. Rep. 370 (1910), (dealer) Spooner v.
Cummings, see note 5, supra (individual engaged in sale).
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fide purchaser.10 However, the sale having taken place within the
actual authority conferred, it is not necessary that the subvendee
be a bona fide purchaser for value any more than if he had pur-
chased from the vendor.-- Title passes on the general principles
of agency, by such authority, the agent is empowered to convey
the title of the principal. If there exists only apparent authority 2
or if the buyer were exceeding his express authority to resell,",
then the subvendee should be bone fide of character. Some prin-
ciple of estoppel must be present to give him priority over the
vendor.
The adoption of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act has settled
and unified the laws of many states. Section 9 of the Act1
provides.
"When goods are delivered under a conditional sale con-
tract and the seller expressly or impliedly consents that
the buyer may resell them prior to performance of the con-
dition, the reservation of property shall be void against
purchasers from the buyer for value in the ordinary course
of business, and as to them the buyer shall be deemed the
owner of the goods, even though the co;itract or a copy
thereof shall be filed according to the provisions of this
act."
A few of the courts have held that authority in the conditional
vendee to resell is inconsistent with the essentials of a conditional
sale contract, i.e., the reservation-of-title clause, and that the effect
is to make the sale an absolute one with title vesting absolutely
in the buyer. In the case of Ludden v. Hazen.' the New York
court held.
"This transaction cannot be upheld as a conditional sale.
By the contract of sale and the delivery of the liquors to
Hackett to make a part of his stock in trade and to be
retailed to his customers, the property vested in him and
became liable for his debts."
A number of the cases have held that such authority to resell
was fraudulent as to the subsequent purchasers and creditors of the
"Spooner v. Cummtngs, see note 5, supra, Flint Wagon Works v.
Maloney, 3 Boyce 137, 81 At. 502 (1911) South Bend Iron Works v. Reedy,
see note 9, supra.
"'Brett v. Forseen, see note 5, supra, Robinson's Appeal, see note 9,
supra.
" Clarke Bros. v. McNatt, see note 6, supra, Citizens' Sav. & Invest. Co.,
see note 6, supra, Miss. River Logg-ng Co. v. Miller, 109 Wis. 307, 85 N. W
193 (1901).
13 Peasley v. Noble, see note 9, supra.
2, See Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 2, page 15.
531 Barb. 650 (1860).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
conditional vendee, thereby rendering the reservation of title void
as to them.
6
The theory of estoppel has been the basis of many of the deci-
sions.'" A recent Connecticut case' 8 held that where an article is
sold to a retail dealer for the apparent purpose of resale, a condition
that the title shall remain in the seller until the price is paid is
ineffectual as against a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary course
of business. The conditional vendor is held to be estopped to deny
the validity of a sale by one to whom he has given apparent power
to sell. An Alabama court19 stated the rule as follows
"Where the owner by his act of consent, has given an-
other such evidence of the right to sell or otherwise dispose
of his goods, as according to the customs of the common
understanding usually accompanied the authority of sale
or disposition, 1 1 4 a sale by the person thus intrusted
with possesion of the good and with the sndicia of owner
ship, or of authority to sell or otherwise dispose of them in
violation of his duty to the owner, to an innocent pur-
chaser for value, will prevail against the reserved title of
the owner."
The fact that the conditional vendee is a dealer in goods of a
class covered by the conditional sale raises certain implications
or appearances of a power to resell that do not exist in other and
usual conditional sales. 20  Authority to resell in such a case is
usually held to be an apparent authority But, according to the
Washington case of Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle,2' the mere
fact that an automobile was delivered to a mortgagor and placed in
his show rooms was not sufficient upon which to base an estoppel as
against the mortgagee when the automobile came into the hands of
an innocent purchaser. The court in that case said
"Where mortgagee 's course of dealing is clearly shown
to the effect that it never gave the mortgagor reason to
believe that it had any authority to sell any car until after
it had procured a release of the mortgage as to such car,
these expressions fall far short of establishing an intent
,Winchester Wagon Works & Mfg. Co. v. Carman, 109 Ind. 31, 9 N. E.
707, 58 Am. Rep. 382 (1887) Re Garcewich, 53 C. C. A. 510, 115 Fed. 87
(1902) Flint Wagon Works v. Buttles, 153 Fed. 932 (1907)
" Flint Wagon Works Co. v. Maloney, see note 10, s-upra, Bent v.
Jerkins, 112 Ala. 485, 20 So. 655 (1895) Citizens' Say. & Inv. Co. v. Hunt's
Garage, see note 6, supra,
"O'Loughlin v. E. M. Jennings Co., see note 6, supra.
19 Bent v. Jerkins, see note 17, supra.
"Brett v. Forseen, see note 5, supra, Gump Investment Co. v. Jackson,
142 Va. 190, 128 S. E. 506, 47 A. L. R. 82 (1925).
"119 Wash. 169, 207 Pac. 5 (1922).
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to permit the mortgagor to sell without reference to the
mortgage, or make appellant a party to the fraud upon the
purchaser."
Gramm-Bernstem Motor Truck Co. v. Todd,22 a Washington ease
decided three years later, may be distinguished from the Hardin
case. The conditional vendor in the Gramm case knew of the
dealer's custom of making sales as owners of the trucks and after-
wards remitting the proceeds to secure a release of the conditional
sales. Thus, the vendor was estopped by its conduct to claim that
it was the owner of the truck and that the vendee had no authority
to sell it and convey a good title.
The next question of interest is what is meant by permission to
sell in the ordinary course of trade. Some decisions have held
that one who buys the whole stock in bulk is not subject to the
protection of purchasers from a retailer in the due and ordinary
course of trade.23 If the resale made by the buyer is of a totally
different character from that which the seller authorized or is
estopped to deny that he authorized, he is not estopped to assert
his title.2' A contrary view was expressed in the case of Bass v.
International Harvester Co.25 wherein the court said that the weight
of authority did not confine the waiver or estoppel in favor of
purchasers in retail or the ordinary course of trade but extended
it to all innocent purchasers for value. Although the goods be
sold to a retailer to dispose of it in the ordinary course of trade, an
innocent purchaser would be protected, even though the conditional
vendee exceeded his express authority in making the sale. If he
sold only in the ordinary course, then any expression as to protec-
tion of innocent purchasers would be unnecessary for he would not
exceed his authority
Should the constructive notice furnished by the recording of the
conditional sale contract prevail as aganst a buyer from a retailer
in the ordinary course of business 9 In a Georgia case, Crenshaw v.
Wilkes, 26 the court held that since the authority to sell is regarded
as invalidating the reserved title, the fact that the seller has com-
plied with all statutory requirements as to- filing or recording is
imnaterial. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act is in accord with
this view and provides that "even though the contract or a copy
thereof shall be filed according to the provisions of this act, the
purchasers from the buyer for value in the ordinary course of
business, shall be deemed the owner of the goods. The Washington
- 121 Wash. 145, 209 Pac. 3 (1926).
"Burbank v. Crooker, 7 Gray 158, 66 Am. Dec. 470 (1858)
Peasley v. Noble, see note 0, supra.
See note 9, supra, South Bend Iron v. Reedy, see note 9, supra,
Columbus Buggy Go. v. Turley, 73 Miss. 529, 19 So. 232, 32 L. R. A. 260,
55 Am. St. Rep 550 (1895) Mishawaka Woolen MIg. Co. v. Westveer, 112
C. C. A. 109, 191 Fed. 465 (1911).
28134 Ga. 684, 68 S. E. 498 (1910).
,'See note 22, supra.
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case of Gramm-Bernstesn Motor Truck Co. v. Todd27 appears also
to be in accord with this view The court held that a manufacturer
of trucks, which delivered possession of trucks to a dealer under
conditional sales contracts, duly recorded, is estopped to assert its
reserved title, as against a bona fide purchaser from the dealer,
where it knew of the dealer's custom, for a period of years to make
sales as owner of the trucks and afterwards remit the proceeds to
secure a release of the conditional sales, since its conduct is incon-
sistent with the idea of retaining title by virtue of the contracts.
"If one intends to claim title under a conditional sale contract
his conduct must not be inconsistent with the terms of this instru-
ment. It is contended by those who adopt this view that by this
reservation of title and permission to resell, the vendor is doing two
inconsistent things,2 and that a purchaser for value in the regular
course of business ought not to be required to examine the records
to learn whether the retailer has title. To so require would greatly
interfere with the exchange of property and would place cumber-
some restraints upon business which modern courts are reluctant
to do. The fact that the goods have been put in the retailer's stock
with the consent of the wholsesaler should be some evidence that
they are to be sold and that the retailer has the right to convey
The Maryland courts have refused to go that far. In a recent
case2 9 it was contended that regardless of the statute in force in
the state relating to conditional sales agrements, it would be con-
trary to public policy to permit a manufacturer to retain a lien
under such an agreement on a truck sold to a dealer who might
resell it, because the existence of such a lien would be inconsistent
with the dealer's right to resell and might result in loss to an
innocent purchaser for value. The court said that the statute
would have to be strictly construed and that if any injustice re-
sulted in the case, the legislature alone would be the body to
remedy it.
CREDITORS
The courts of the various states are not agreed as to whether a
reservation of title under a conditional sale contract is valid as
to creditors of the conditional sale vendee when the vendee is auth-
orized to resell in the ordinary course of trade. Some jurisdictions,
and notably the Federal courts, 0 hold that where the seller author-
" Bowe v. Finance & G. Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591, 10 A. L. R.
654 (1920) Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle, see note 21, supra.
Finance & Guiaranty Co. v. Deflance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 94,
125 AtI. 585 (1924).
t*Re Garcewtch, 53 C. C. A. 510, 115 Fed. 87 (1902) Ludden v. Hazen,
31 Barb. 650 (1860) Re Penny, 176 Fed. 141 (1909) Re Agnew, 178 Fed.
478 (1909) Cowerta Fertilizer Co. v. Brown, 89 C. C. A. 612, 163 Fed. 162
(1908) Re Howland, 109 Fed. 869 (1901).
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izes the conditional vendee to resell in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, he thereby clothes the vendee with sndicta of ownership, the
reservation of title in the vendor constitutes a fraud upon the
creditors, and hence is void. So far as these cases disclose it is
immaterial whether or not the creditor was a subsequent creditor
and extended credit in reliance upon the fictitious credit in tins
manner secured by the purchaser.
However, the weight of authority as well as the trend of modern
authority holds that the creditor of the conditional vendee succeeds
merely to the rights of the original vendee and is therefore bound
by the condition.8 1 In the case of Flint Wagon Works Co. v.
Maloney3 2 the question of priority arose as between an execution
creditor of the conditional vendee, and the conditional vendor.
The court held that it was the duty of courts to construe contracts
so as to carry out the intention of the parties and such should be
ascertained from the agreement. The court said.
"It is equally clear that while the vendee was permitted
to sell the carriages in due course of business, and deliver
the same to the purchasers free and discharged from the
condition, the parties did not intend that a creditor of the
vendee should levy upon the property and sell it for his
debts. * * * The effort and intention of the parties was
not to deprive creditors of the right to seize the property
of the vendee for the payment of ins debts, but to save the
property from such seizure."
The court continues.
"In order that the property ight be liable for the debts
of the vendee the title must have been in the vendee,
winch certainly could not be under the law as we under-
stand it. But it is not necessary for the protection of an
innocent purchaser that title to the property shall vest
in the vendee, but that he will not assert his title against
an innocent purchaser from such vendee, when he knew
and had impliedly agreed, that the property might be sold
by the vendee in the regular course of his business."
This latter excerpt seems to be a clear statement of what the
law should logically be with reference to both creditors and pur-
chasers.
In the same case the court in discussing the force of the objec-
tion as to giving false credit88 to the vendee, said.
"(it) has undoubtedly much force so that in many
states the courts consider it as sufficient, but it applies
"Bryant v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 214 U. S. 279, 53 L. ed. 997,
29 Sup. Ct. 161 (1909) Flint Wagon Works v. Maloney, see note 10, supra.
"See note 10, supra.
INewcomb v. Gutherte, 145 Va. 627, 134 S. E. 585 (1926).
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with more or less strength, according to the circumstances,
to all cases of conditional sales where the vendee is clothed
with full possession and apparent ownership, but, as the
court says in Forbes v. Marsh, supra, in this state, all cases
of conditional sales made bona fide have been held good
against attaching creditors, and in reply to the objection
we are considering it warns persons against putting faith
in appearance except where the case comes within the rule
of the vendor retaining possession after the sale, and per-
sons about to give faith on such appearances must make
inquiry, and in this respect the language of our courts is
similar to that of Campbell, J in giving the opinion in
Ketchum v. Brennan, 35 Miss. 596 'A buyer must beware
of purchasing from one who has not title, possession is
not title.' "
According to Schultz v. Wesco Oil Co.," a Washington case
decided in 1928, a recorded conditional sale of goods to be placed
in the stock of merchandise and sold in the course of trade, is void
as to creditors in so far as it reserves the title in the vendor, where
it contains no reservation of title to the proceeds of the goods sold
and no agreement on the part of the vendee to account for the items
sold or any proportion of the proceeds. This case was founded
upon prior decisions3 5 in this state laying down the same doctrine
with reference to chattel mortgages. The leading case was Miller
v. Scarbrough,"6 wherein it was held that a chattel mortgage upon
a shifting stock of merchandise leaving the mortgagor to sell in
the ordinary course of trade, to be valid as against subsequent
creditors, should identify the mortgaged property and must provide
for application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged
property on the mortgaged debt. The following is an excerpt from
another Washington case37 dealing with chattel mortgages
"In short, the instrument was to be a floating mortgage,
under the cover of which from time to time, new stock to
an uncertain limit must be and beyond that limit might
be introduced. It is to cover all of the mortgagor's stock,
however large it may become. This feature of itself is
enough to avoid the instrument, for it would serve the
mortgagee, without any corresponding lawful advantage
to him. But this instrument has another fatal infirmity
If ny of he hypothecated goods are to be sold in trade or
the rest of the property pro tano from the mortgage."
"149 Wash. 21, 170 Pac. 130 (1928).
Miller v. Scarbrough, 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919) Warner 'V.
Hibler 146 Wash. 65, 264 Pac. 423 (1928) BVrL v. Forbes, 3 W T. 318,
13 Pac. 715 (1918).
U See note 35, supra.
"Byrd v. Forbes, see note 35, supra.
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Washington therefore adopts what seems to be a middle ground
and will permit such a sale to be good against creditors sa far as
the proceeds are applied to reduce the lien.
Pnmmsrs CAVEDER.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SEARCH AND SEIZURE, WITHOUT WAR-
RANT, OF AN AUTOMOIBLE--REASONAB:LE CAUSE-ANoNYMOUS TIPS.
Since the case of Carroll v. United States,' it has become a generally
recognized principle of law that an officer may make a search and
seizure of an automobile without a warrant, provided that the
officer has probable cause to make the search. The Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States specifically is aimed
to protect the people against "unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures."' The Carroll case is based on the theory that if the other
has probable cause the search of an automobile is not an unrea-
sonable search." The distinction drawn is that while the warrant
can easily be issued to search a dwelling house,3 yet because of the
necessity of the situation when an officer has probable cause to
believe that a moving object such as an automobile or motor boat
contains contraband, it would be actually unreasonable to expect
the officer to then get a search warrant, because in the meantime
the moving object would likely be far beyond the reach of the
officer. The Carroll case, supra, which was decided in 1925, has
settled the law as far as the United States Supreme Court is con-
cerned, and the principle has since been applied several times in
other Federal cases.4
The constitutionality of a search and seizure of an automobile
without a warrant has been upheld recently in the State of Wash-
mgton in the case of State v. Knudsen.5 In this case a Federal
prohibition officer received a tip from an unknown person that the
defendant was supplying intoxicating liquors in a certain locality
The officer knew that the defendant had been previously convicted
of the crime of possession, and acting upon the tip he had re-
ceived, he and some other officers located the defendant's truck,
followed it, noticed that it was loaded heavily, and saw it turn into
'267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. CtL Rep 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1924).
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Sutherland dissenting.
2Article IV of the Amendments to the United States Constitution.
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524
(1886) Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B
834, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, Ann. Cas. 1915C. 1177 (1914) Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4, 51 A. L. R. 409 (1925).
'United States v. One Reo Truck, 6 Fed. (2d) 412 (1925) Latle v.
United States, 5 Fed. (2d) 622 (1925), holding a search and seizure valid
as long as the officers had probable cause; Pinder v. United States, 4 Fed.
(2d) 390 (1925), where an inspector seized liquor in a parker car- Lafazza
v. United States, 4 Fed. (2d) 817 (1925), where the officers in following
a truck saw through its lattice sides that it contained cases of liquor.
r 54 Wash. Dec. 39, 280 Pac. 922 (1929).
